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The G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Bala nced Growth builds on the claim  that growing
imbalances before the 2008 Financial Crisis were a major cause of the crisis, and the further claim
that reducing imbalances post crisis must be a  central part of any effort to prevent a further
occurrence. Analytical literature in econom ics seemingly does not provide satisfactory m easures of
financial instability, either in individual nationa l economies or in the com bined global economy; nor
ways of linking imbalance change to either worsen ing or improving financial (or real) instability and
the onset of financial crises. 
Here we focus on the external sector com ponent of financial instability and link changes in country
imbalances to individual economy growth rates in ways when summed across countries produce
indices of expected worsening or improving financial instability at different points in time. We
compute a variety of such indices for the years immediately before the 2008 Financial Crisis. We
use  the sum   of the absolute value of external  sector  imbalances  across countries (the trade
imbalance, or the current account im balance) as a proportion of the com bined GDP of countries and
link them in various ways to country growth ra tes. An increasing measure under an index is an
indication of future widening excess demands and supplies over all countries as a group relative to
gross world product. This, in turn, is an indication of increasing severity of adjustment problems
ahead, and hence expected worsening financial instability. We compute such indices for all G20
countries, and various subsets of countries(G2,  G8, G8+5) and examine their behavior over the
period 2004-2007. 
Our results suggest that depending upon the index used and the base date chosen for comparative
purposes in determining changes, different implications emerge for the linkage between external
sector imbalances, perceived future instability and hence the onset of  a financial crisis. The
implication we drawn is that the l inks between imbalances and both the onset and best policy
response to the 2008 Financial Crisis asserted by the G20 m ay be more tenuous than claimed. Indeed
no such links were suggested earlier for the 1930s, th e Asian Financial Crisis or any other crisis. In
turn  economies  have functioned with larger  imbalances  relative to GDP t han  in  2008 for
considerable periods of time and with no financial implosion (UK in the pre World War I period;
Germany and Australia in the 1990s).John Whalley
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growth.  This  stands  in  contrast  to  analytical  literature  in  economics  which  provides  no 
satisfactory  measures  either  of  the  degree  of  either  real  or  financial  instability,  either 
individual national economies or in the combined global economy
1, nor whether financial 




tâtonnement  price  adjustment  scheme  has  characterized  both  stable  and  unstable 
adjustment processes, but remains silent on both the characterization and measurement of 
the degree of instability; either financial or real. The post‐crisis literature which attempts to 




















historical  experience;  and  whether  we  use  simple  averages  to  form  group  averages  or 
weight the individual country index values by their GDP to form a group average. 


















































the  interpretation  of  the  condition  of  a  financial  system.  Berger  et  al.  (2009)  assess 
“competition‐fragility”  and“competition‐stability”  by  regressing  measures  of  loan  risk, 
bank risk, and bank equity capital on measures of market power. Adrian and Shin (2010) 
describe  the  changing  nature  of  financial  intermediation  in  the  market‐based  financial 






















































national  Balance  of  Payment  (BOP)  sources  without  reconciling  statistical  differences  in 
global trade data. Thus, present available data on international trade, both in goods and 















argues  that  international  imbalances  recorded  using  traditional  balance  of  payments 
accounting  presumes  national  vertically  integrated  production  of  exports.  However,  this 
may  not  be  the  most  appropriate  method  to  measure  imbalances  when  multinational 
corporations operate global production chains that are geographically distributed across a 
number of national boundaries and financed by global financial institutions.  
We  then  relate  the 
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imbalances  in  the  future.  Our  second  approach  incorporates  an  assumed  endogenous 







































In  assigning  +1/‐1  indices  to  G20  countries,  we  use  two  alternatively  ways  of 











We  then  develop  a  second  index  approach  by  assuming  that  there  is  an 
endogenous  adjustment  mechanism  in  economies  imbalances  given  exogenous  future 
expected growth rates both domestically and in other economies. For this we assume that 






Under  such  assumptions  a  country  is  improving  global  external  financial  instability  by 
self‐adjustment and we assign ‐1 index for such country for the year.  
An economy experiencing high GDP growth and a deficit in trade would import 
more  to  support  its  strong  domestic  market  demand,  thus  would  worsen  its  trade 



















index  for  individual  countries.  Positive  indices  represent  expected  future  worsening 
instability and negative indices represent expected improving instability. Again we calculate 
two  set  of  indices  by  using  alternative  benchmarks  of  average  growth  rates  “Across 
Countries” and “Through Time”. 
Though a country’s various +1/‐1 indices can be used to represent changes in a 









its  GDP  growth  rates  using  current  account  imbalances  instead  of  trade  imbalances. 
Following the same procedure, we can compute the +1/‐1 indices using either the first or 
second  approach;  also  using  either  the  “Across  Countries”  or  “Through  Time”  method; 
either for individual countries or an aggregation of country groups; and either for a single 
year or aggregation for time periods.  
These  procedures  thus  yield  a  number  of  closely  related  indices  of  expected 
worsening or weakening external financial instability each linking imbalances measures to 
country’s GDP growth performance. We can also develop further indices using piecewise 












































G20 Countries   1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s  2000s  2000‐07  2008‐09 
A. Larger Developed 
Canada   1.1  1.6  2.7  2.8  3.8  4.5  1.7 
France  NA  0.4  1.2  1.0  1.4  1.0  2.7 
Germany  NA  2.7  4.1  2.6  6.4  6.3  6.5 
Italy  NA  1.0  1.0  2.2  0.5  0.6  0.1 
Japan  NA  0.8  3.0  2.7  2.0  2.3  0.8 
United Kingdom  NA  2.2  2.4  2.1  5.3  5.1  6.2 
United States  NA  0.8  2.3  2.4  5.2  5.4  4.7 
B. Smaller Developed 
Australia  1.7  1.7  0.7  0.9  1.4  1.9  0.3 
Netherlands  0.6  1.2  3.6  4.8  6.5  6.4  6.8 
Spain  NA  3.0  4.6  3.9  6.8  7.0  6.2 
C. Middle Income 
Korea Rep.  NA  2.7  3.6  2.7  3.4  3.3  3.5 
Mexico  NA  0.3  3.7  2.3  1.1  1.0  1.1 
Russia  NA  NA  NA  3.2  12.4 13.8  10.0 
Saudi Arabia  NA  36.7 20.6  16.4 34.9 33.7  37.9 
Turkey  NA  3.4  4.2  5.8  6.1  6.2  5.8 
Argentina  NA  1.5  3.3  1.3  5.9  6.1  5.3 
Brazil  NA  0.8  3.3  1.4  2.7  3.3  1.6 
D. Lower Income 
China  NA  NA  1.6  3.1  5.9  5.6  6.6 
India  NA  0.5  2.3  1.8  4.3  3.1  6.9 
Indonesia  NA  NA  4.7  5.9  8.1  9.4  5.5 
South Africa  3.6  4.4  5.3  3.3  1.6  1.9  0.9 
E. Groups 
G2 (China/ US)  NA  0.7  2.3  2.4  5.4  5.4  5.2 
G8   0.1  1.1  2.5  2.4  4.4  4.5  4.1 
G8+5  0.1  1.1  2.5  2.4  4.4  4.4  4.2 
G12   0.0  1.1  2.5  2.4  4.5  4.6  4.4 
Developed of G20  0.1  1.2  2.5  2.4  4.2  4.3  3.9 
Developing of G20  0.2  3.4  4.4  3.2  6.3  6.2  6.5 
G20  0.1  1.5  2.8  2.5  4.7  4.7  4.6 


















ratios.  Group  wise  imbalance  ratios  measured  by  the  current  account  imbalance  ratios 
increased sharply after the early 2000s, decreased in 2007 and 2008, and dropped sharply in 
2009. The major difference between these two imbalance ratios is that the current account 






Financial  Crisis  (Absolute  Value  of  Trade  Balance  /  GDP,  Absolute  Value  of  Current 
Account Balance / GDP, %) 
   1980s  1990s  2000s  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Trade  2.3  2.4  5.4  6.3  6.7  6.6  6.5  3.9  G2 (China and 
United States)  CA  2.0  1.7  5.1  6.2  6.7  6.4  6.0  3.5 
Trade  2.5  2.4  4.4  5.0  5.1  5.1  4.8  3.3  G8 
CA  2.0  1.8  3.8  4.5  4.9  4.5  4.0  2.9 
Trade  2.5  2.4  4.4  4.9  5.2  5.2  5.0  3.4  G8+5 
CA  2.0  1.8  3.9  4.4  4.9  4.7  4.5  3.1 
Trade  2.5  2.4  4.5  5.1  5.4  5.5  5.3  3.5  G12 (GDP > 1 
Trillion)  CA  2.0  1.8  4.0  4.7  5.1  5.0  4.7  3.3 
Trade  2.5  2.4  4.2  4.8  4.9  5.0  4.6  3.1  Developed of 
G20  CA  2.1  1.9  3.9  4.6  5.0  4.8  4.2  2.9 
Trade  4.4  3.2  6.3  7.1  7.7  7.4  7.6  5.5  Developing of 
G20  CA  3.3  2.5  4.7  5.3  5.9  5.7  6.3  4.0 
Trade  2.8  2.5  4.7  5.3  5.6  5.6  5.4  3.7  G20 
CA  2.3  2.0  4.1  4.7  5.2  5.0  4.8  3.2 
Trade  2.6  2.7  4.4  4.9  5.0  5.0  4.7  3.4  OECD 










































Index Approach  1990  1995  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Growth Performance 
GDP Growth Rate  3.3 3.1 4.8 1.8 2.2 3.7 4.8 4.4  4.8   4.8   2.7  -1.5 
|Trade balance|/GDP  3.7 3.4 5.7 4.9 5.6 5.8 6.2 6.6 6.8    6.6    6.5 4.9 
|Current Account 
Balance|/GDP 
2.5 2.0 3.6 2.6 2.9 3.5 4.3 5.0 5.6 5.3 5.1 3.2 
Trade Imbalance based indices using different index approach ‐ arithmetic average 
Type I‐Across Countries  4 -1  15  -1  -3  11  5 7 5 1 1 9 
Type I‐Through Time  -6 -1 1 13 5 -5 1 5 11  11  -7 3 
Type II‐Across Countries  -1 11 -3 -3 1  1 -3 -1 -1 -5 -5 -5 
Type II‐Through Time  3 3 1 7 5 5 5 3 -1 1 -5 7 
Current Account Imbalance based indices using different index approach ‐ arithmetic average 
Type I‐Across Countries  6 3 7 -5 1 5 -3 1 -3 -1 5 1 
Type I‐Through Time  -4 3 3 5 -1 5 3 -5 9 3 -7 1 
Type II‐Across Countries  1  1 -9 -3 -1 -5 -5 -3 -1 -7 -5 -7 
Type II‐Through Time  5 5 3 7 3 3 3 1 -1  -1  -5 1 
Trade Imbalance based indices using different index approach ‐ weighted average 
Type I‐Across Countries  0.45 0.55 0.83 0.40 0.46 0.65 0.53 0.57 0.72 0.52 0.46 0.57 
Type I‐Through Time  -0.09 0.29  0.16  0.04 -0.11 -0.52  0.33 0.54 0.60 0.07  -0.53  -0.26 
Type II‐Across Countries  -0.64 0.20 -0.27 -0.24 -0.20 -0.13 -0.27 -0.25 -0.34 -0.38 -0.42 -0.36 
Type II‐Through Time  -0.38  -0.18 0.24 0.03  -0.08 0.05 0.38 0.53 0.22  -0.32  -0.28 0.01 
Current Account Imbalance based indices using different index approach ‐ weighted average 
Type I‐Across Countries  0.37  0.28 -0.03 -0.39 -0.07 -0.01 -0.21 -0.05 -0.13  0.48  0.56  0.50 
Type I‐Through Time  0.03  0.36  0.30 -0.10 -0.35 -0.29  0.42 -0.01  0.64 -0.08 -0.68  0.03 
Type II‐Across Countries  -0.69 -0.11 -0.43 -0.21 -0.29 -0.27 -0.30 -0.34 -0.34 -0.48 -0.39 -0.39 











































Index Approach  1990  1995  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Compare with 1 Year Before ‐ arithmetic average indices
Type I‐Across Countries  14 4 16  -16  -2  14  -6 2 -2 -4 0 8 
Type I‐Through Time  -6 6 -4  12  -8  -10  6 4 6 0  -18  10 
Type II‐Across Countries  -6 2 -6 0 4 0 -4 2 0 -4 0 0 
Type II‐Through Time  4 4 -2 6 -2 0 0 -2 -4 2 -6  12 
Compare with 1 Year Before – weighted average indices
Type I‐Across Countries  1.10 0.62 1.05 ‐0.43 0.06 0.18 ‐0.12 0.04 0.16  ‐0.20  ‐0.07 0.11
Type I‐Through Time  0.02 1.03 ‐0.06 ‐0.12 ‐0.15 ‐0.41 0.85 0.21 0.05  ‐0.53  ‐0.60 0.27
Type II‐Across Countries  -0.90 -0.59 ‐0.86 0.03 0.04 0.07 ‐0.15 0.03 ‐0.09  ‐0.05  ‐0.03 0.06
Type II‐Through Time  -0.55 -0.51 ‐0.27 ‐0.21 ‐0.11 0.13 0.33 0.16 ‐0.31  ‐0.54  0.04 0.29
Compare with 5 Years Before –arithmetic average indices
Type I‐Across Countries  8  -5 16 4 -10  16 6  -8  6  4 -10 4 
Type I‐Through Time  -6 5 2 16  10 0 -4 4 -2 6 -2 2 
Type II‐Across Countries  -8 12  -14  -6 -2 -6 -6 2  2 -6 -6 -2 
Type II‐Through Time  -2 0 -2 6 8 -2 2 2 -8 -4  -10  2 
Compare with 5 Years Before – weighted average indices
Type I‐Across Countries  0.81 0.10 0.28 -0.12 0.31 1.02 0.75 -0.26 0.32 0.06 -0.19 0.05 
Type I‐Through Time  0.20 0.38 -0.13 0.48 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.38 0.56 0.18 -0.01 -0.59
Type II‐Across Countries  -1.00 0.83 -0.47 -0.27 -0.74 -0.60 -0.86 0.03 -0.10 -0.18 -0.29 -0.08
Type II‐Through Time  -0.62 0.20 0.41 -0.30 -0.43 -0.48 -0.13 0.29 0.19 -0.23 -0.33 -0.37
Compare with 10 Years Before –arithmetic average indices 
Type I‐Across Countries  -2 3 11  -1 -3  11  10 8 10  -6 6 10 
Type I‐Through Time  -8 -1 7 15 7 -1 8  6 14  16 -2 -2 
Type II‐Across Countries  -4  4  -2  2  -8  -8 -12  -12 -4  -8 -12 -8 
Type II‐Through Time  0 -2 -2  10 2 -4 6 0 -2 4  -12  4 
Compare with 10 Years Before – weighted average indices 
Type I‐Across Countries  -0.33 0.91 0.38 0.21 0.72 0.54 0.59 0.02 0.20 0.37 0.83 0.79 
Type I‐Through Time  -0.45 0.58 0.25 -0.38 0.30 -0.05 1.07 0.25 1.04 0.39 0.13 -0.48
Type II‐Across Countries  -0.55 -0.17 0.37  0.46 -0.85 -0.86 -1.05 -0.44 -0.37 -0.92 -0.88 -0.95










Japan  and  China  based  on  trade  imbalances  using  the  Type  I  index  approach  and  the 
Through Time method, as well as the changes in indices compared to 1 year, 5 years and 10 




equal)  numbers  showing  +1  indices  than ‐ 1  indices  in  these  years.  The  indices  for  G8 
increase between 2003 and 2006, and decrease between 2007 and 2008. There are 4 out 8 
members of G8 with +1 indices in 2003, 5 out of 8 in 2004 and 2007, 6 out of 8 members in 








among these four economies. There are seven years in the 2000s that the indices for the US show 
no difference from previous years; No obvious evidence also appears that there is sharp worsening 
in expected external financial instability for the for G8, the US, Japan and China year by year before 
the 2008 financial crisis. 
Comparing indices with 5 years before, the G8 worsens in instability between 2001 
















  1990  1995  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Indices
G8  -3 2 0 2 2 0 2 4 4 2 -2 0 
US  1  1  1 -1 -1 -1 1  1  1 -1 -1 -1 
Japan  -1 1 -1 1  1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1  1 
China  1 -1  1 1 1 -1  -1  1 1 1 -1  -1 
Compare with 1 Year before
G8  -2 6  ‐2  2  0 ‐ 2  2  2  0 ‐ 2 ‐ 4  2 
US  2 2  0  -2 0 0 2 0 0  -2 0 0 
Japan  -2  2  0 2 0  -2 2 0  -2 0 2 0 
China  0 0  2 0 0  -2 0 2 0 0  -2 0 
Compare with 5 Years before
G8  -2 5  ‐2  4  4  4  0  4  2  0 ‐ 2 ‐ 2 
US  2 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0  -2 
Japan  -2  2  -2 2 0 0 2 2  -2  -2 2 0 
China  0  -2  2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Compare with 10 Years before
G8  -6 3  3 ‐ 1  1  1  6  2  6  4  2 ‐ 2 
US  0 2  0  -2 0 0 2 0 2 0 0  -2 
Japan  0 0  0 0 2 0 2 0 0  -2 2 2 











































  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Indices
G8  -0.10 0.38 0.12  -0.17  -0.23  -0.42 0.39 0.47 0.42  -0.17  -0.34 -0.27 
US  0.31 0.29  0.36  -0.38  -0.38  -0.35  0.34 0.33 0.33  -0.31  -0.29 -0.30 
Japan  -0.17 0.21  -0.17  0.15  0.14  -0.14 0.13 0.12  -0.11  -0.10 0.10 0.11 
China  0.02 -0.03  0.04  0.05  0.05  -0.05  -0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 -0.09 -0.11 
Compare with 1 Year before
G8  0.06 1.06  -0.08  -0.29  -0.07  -0.18  0.81  0.09 -0.05 -0.59 -0.17  0.07 
US  0.64 0.60  0.01  -0.74  +0.00 0.02 0.69 -0.00  -0.00  -0.64 0.02 -0.01 
Japan  -0.35 0.42  -0.01  0.32  -0.01  -0.28 0.27 -0.01  -0.23 0.01 0.20  0.01 
China  -0.00  -0.00  0.09 0.01  +0.00 -0.10 -0.00 0.11 0.01 0.01 -0.17 -0.01 
Compare with 5 Years before
G8  0.25 0.48  -0.26  0.27  +0.00 0.23 0.18 0.35 0.59 0.07 0.08 -0.66 
US  0.73 -0.02  0.07  -0.07  -0.05  -0.01  -0.02 -0.03 0.71 0.07  0.06  -0.64 
Japan  -0.30 0.38  -0.38  0.34  -0.03  0.02 0.30 0.29  -0.26  -0.24 0.23 -0.02 
China  -0.01 -0.05 0.07  0.08 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
Compare with 10 Years before
G8  -0.47 0.73 0.22  -0.65  0.14 0.01 1.07 0.09 0.86 0.07 0.31 -0.47 
US  -0.01 0.71 0.05  -0.69  -0.08  -0.04 0.65 0.04 0.64 0.02 0.05 -0.66 
Japan  -0.04  0.07 -0.01  -0.03 0.32 0.07  0.34 -0.09 0.08 -0.27 0.25  0.27 







The  Pittsburgh  G20  meeting  in  September  2009  resulted  in  agreement  on  a 
framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth and this, in turn, has provided the 
impetus for major effects to reduce global imbalances as a key element to a G20 strategy of 




A  recent  G20  finance  ministers  meeting  has  resulted  in  a  commitment  by  G20 
countries to produce five indicators of financial instability, one of which is based on trade 
imbalances.  Our  discussion  sets  out  how  country  measures  of  imbalance  ratios  can  be 
combined both across time and across countries to provide aggregate measures of one key 
element  in  imbalances,  namely  external  sector  imbalances.  The  hope  is  that  aggregate 
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